Tournament incentives and reserve management
學年 113
學期 2
出版（發表）日期 2025-07-27
作品名稱 Tournament incentives and reserve management
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Chia-Ling Ho; Gene Lai; Gunratan Lonare
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Risk Management and Insurance Review , Early View
摘要 This paper examines the impact of internal tournament incentives on reserve management within the property-liability insurance industry. We find a positive relationship between internal tournament incentives and reserve errors, suggesting that a larger tournament prize is associated with more conservative loss-reserve management. In contrast to the literature on nonfinancial firms, we do not observe a positive association between tournament incentives and risk-taking behavior or performance. The overall evidence indicates that vice presidents participating in internal tournaments prioritize strong financial health over performance. Moreover, the positive effect of tournament incentives on conservative reserve management is more pronounced for insurers with more volatile returns and a higher ratio of claim loss reserves to total liabilities. This effect attenuates for larger insurers, those underwriting long-tail lines, and those operating in less competitive environments. Our findings also suggest that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act significantly influences executives' reserve behavior. Finally, we show that stronger board monitoring is associated with more conservative reserve practices in internal tournaments.
關鍵字
語言 en_US
ISSN
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 ESCI
產學合作 國外
通訊作者
審稿制度 是
國別 USA
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/128220 )

SDGS 優質教育,尊嚴就業與經濟發展