| Nash Equilibria of a Two-Party Policy Competition Game | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 112 |
| 學期 | 2 |
| 發表日期 | 2024-05-17 |
| 作品名稱 | Nash Equilibria of a Two-Party Policy Competition Game |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Lin, Chuang-chieh; Lu, Chi-jen; Chen, Po-an |
| 作品所屬單位 | |
| 出版者 | |
| 會議名稱 | the 41st Workshop on Combinatorial Mathematics and Computation Theory (CMCT 2024) |
| 會議地點 | 台北市，台灣 |
| 摘要 | Abstract—We introduce the two-party policy competition as a two player non-cooperative game, which is an extended work of [Lin et al. 2021]. The player which can benefit the all voters more has higher chance of winning and the payoff is the expected utility that its supporters will have. By formulating the winning probability as an outcome of a linear function, we show that the two-party policy competition game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in the degenerate case of one-dimension and in the general case under the so-called consensus-reachable assumption. |
| 關鍵字 | Pure-strategy;Nash equilibrium;Game theory |
| 語言 | en_US |
| 收錄於 | |
| 會議性質 | 國內 |
| 校內研討會地點 | 無 |
| 研討會時間 | 20240517~20240518 |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 國別 | TWN |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | |
| 出處 | Proceedings of the 41st Workshop on Combinatorial Mathematics and Computation Theory (CMCT 2024) |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/125480 ) |
| SDGS | 優質教育 |
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