| Do executive or industry expert auditors matter for new clients? Evidence from the business life cycle | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 115 |
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版(發表)日期 | 2026-08-01 |
| 作品名稱 | Do executive or industry expert auditors matter for new clients? Evidence from the business life cycle |
| 作品名稱(其他語言) | |
| 著者 | Yi-Hsing Liao; Yu-Shan Chang |
| 單位 | |
| 出版者 | |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 22(2), p. 100566 |
| 摘要 | This study examines how firms at different life-cycle stages select between executive auditors—who possess hierarchical authority—and industry expert auditors, and how these choices shape subsequent reporting outcomes. While new clients generally avoid both types, incorporating life-cycle heterogeneity reveals distinct patterns: growth firms preferentially engage expert auditors, declining firms favor executive auditors; and mature firms exhibit broader, non-exclusive demand for both, with a stronger tilt toward executive auditors. Analyses of accrual-based outcomes show that executive auditors allow greater negotiated discretion only for low-risk clients, whereas expert auditors consistently constrain opportunistic reporting across risk conditions. These inferences remain robust when accounting for endogeneity using entropy balancing and when applying an alternative life-cycle classification. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how life-cycle dynamics shape auditor contracting and how auditor attributes differentially influence financial reporting quality. |
| 關鍵字 | Auditor selection; Hierarchical authority; Industry expertise; Earnings management; Life cycle |
| 語言 | en_US |
| ISSN | |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | SSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 否 |
| 國別 | USA |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,電子版 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/129321 ) |