Welfare Analysis in a Vertically-Related Market with Endogenous Price or Quantity Choice
學年 111
學期 1
出版（發表）日期 2022-09-01
作品名稱 Welfare Analysis in a Vertically-Related Market with Endogenous Price or Quantity Choice
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Hong-Ren Din,Chia-Hung Sun
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Taiwan Economic Review 50, 303–327
摘要 This research investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities in a vertically-related market where an integrated firm competes with a downstream firm and they bargain over a two-part tariff input pricing contract. Contrary to the standard result, we show that both Bertrand competition and Cournot competition can be sustained as equilibrium outcomes. First, the Bertrand equilibrium maximizes industry profit, but there is a market failure in the choice of the type of strategic variables. Second, the Cournot equilibrium maximizes social welfare and consumer surplus, but there is a prisoners' dilemma. This paper ends with an extension, showing that our baseline model arises naturally as the equilibrium outcome of a simple game that admits vertical mergers.
關鍵字 vertically-related markets, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, endogenous strategic variables, Nash bargaining solution
語言 zh_TW
ISSN
期刊性質 國內
收錄於 TSSCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度 0
國別 TWN
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版