Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
學年 110
學期 2
出版（發表）日期 2022-06-16
作品名稱 Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Din, Hong-Ren, Sun, Chia-Hung
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of Economics 138, 73–94
摘要 This research investigates the endogenous choice of centralized or decentralized bargaining and the type of strategic variables by taking into account a vertically-related market where an upstream monopolist bargains with two downstream firms via a two-part input pricing contract. We show that centralized bargaining is the unique equilibrium mode of bargaining, given Cournot or Bertrand competition in the product market, and that choosing the quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms under decentralized (centralized) bargaining. When both the type of strategic variables and the mode of bargaining are endogenously determined, the unique equilibrium outcome is choosing price contracts and centralized bargaining, which maximize industry profit, but there is market failure.
關鍵字
語言 zh_TW
ISSN
期刊性質 國內
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度 0
國別 TWN
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版