Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier
學年 112
學期 2
出版（發表）日期 2024-02-11
作品名稱 Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Kao, Kuo-feng
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of Public Economic Theory 26(1),　e12682
摘要 It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither allows the licenser of the new technology to earn large profit nor helps welfare to increase much. In a model with an outside innovator (the licenser), a final good producer (the licensee) and an input supplier, we offer a new perspective to the literature by considering a licensing option, which is often observed in the business world, but ignored in the literature. We show that the licensing option offered by the outside innovator can prevent rent extraction by the input supplier. The innovator's profit and social welfare are higher under licensing option compared to a standard licensing contract with no option.
關鍵字 hold-up problem;licensing option;vertically related industry
語言 en_US
ISSN 1467-9779
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI EconLit
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度 是
國別 USA
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/125103 )