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摘要
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In recent decades, with its Eastern enlargement and Brexit, the European Union’s economic dynamics moved from the West to the East, while Germany benefitted from its central economic power position in the bloc. On the other side of the Eurasian continent, China has initiated an economic dynamic towards its Western territories and the post-Soviet space. However, Russia stagnated economically and politically between the EU and China, contributing to Ukraine’s invasion. The connectivity sectors of finance and investment, infrastructure and transport, energy and pipelines, and people-to-people exchanges became sanction mechanisms. However, also China and Russia use distinct yet less obvious mechanisms to weaponise interdependence. This article explores the weaponisation of interdependence strategies of the EU, China, and Russia and what they mean for Eurasian connectivity, using Chinese stratagem approaches. As the EU is economically yet more dependent on China than on Russia, the debate about decoupling accelerates but is it economically feasible? This paper suggests that the EU's strategy should be twofold. Firstly, it should be status-quo-oriented concerning China in this triangular relationship, as decoupling from China is not feasible or comes with very high costs. However, while the EU's - particularly German- triangular business model of purchasing cheap energy from Russia and exporting expensive manufactured goods to China has ended, also the Belt and Road Project is under threat, as China's support for Russia and its aggressive leadership deters the EU's political willingness for increasing Eurasian connectivity. Therefore, the EU and German industries must invest in resources on the European continent and global market diversification to decrease weaponisation of interdependence risks and achieve higher autonomy. |
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