CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Earnings Management: Does Compensation Structure Matter?
學年 109
學期 2
出版(發表)日期 2021-06-30
作品名稱 CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Earnings Management: Does Compensation Structure Matter?
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Hui-wen Tang; Roger C. Y. Chen.
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of Financial Studies,29 (2),p.1-36
摘要 This study investigates the relationship between excess director compensation and CEO compensation and explores the effects of various abnormal CEO compensations on earnings management. The results show that CEOs who receive abnormal cash and bonus compensation resulting from excess director total compensation tend to increase firm profits through earnings management, thereby reducing future performance. By contrast, CEOs who receive abnormal incentive compensation, total compensation, and exercise-value of stock options are less likely to manipulate earnings. These findings suggest that a proper director and CEO compensation structure can reduce managerial earnings management and can motivate CEO–director collaboration.
關鍵字 Compensation structure;CEO compensation;director compensation;earnings management;incentive compensation
語言 en
ISSN 1022-2898
期刊性質 國內
收錄於 TSSCI
產學合作
通訊作者 Hui-wen Tang
審稿制度
國別 TWN
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版,紙本
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/120945 )