教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 高國峯 Kao, Kuo-Feng (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Vertical Separation and Collusion
學年
學期
出版(發表)日期2020/07/31
作品名稱Vertical Separation and Collusion
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Kuo-Feng Kao; Chin-Sheng Chen
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Taipei Economic Inquiry 56(2), p.243-266
摘要This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is
at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.
關鍵字Vertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;Collusion
語言英文(美國)
ISSN
期刊性質國內
收錄於TSSCI;
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別中華民國
公開徵稿
出版型式,電子版
相關連結
SDGs
  • 尊嚴就業與經濟發展
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