| Vertical Separation and Collusion | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 108 |
| 學期 | 2 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2020-07-31 |
| 作品名稱 | Vertical Separation and Collusion |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | 高國峯; 陳金盛 |
| 單位 | |
| 出版者 | |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | 經濟研究 56(2)，頁243-266 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation. |
| 關鍵字 | Vertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;Collusion |
| 語言 | en_US |
| ISSN | |
| 期刊性質 | 國內 |
| 收錄於 | TSSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 是 |
| 國別 | TWN |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,電子版 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/119079 ) |
| SDGS | 尊嚴就業與經濟發展 |
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