Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story
學年 104
學期 1
出版(發表)日期 2015-10-01
作品名稱 Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Mor Sobol
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Governance 29(3), p.335-350
摘要 Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.
關鍵字
語言 en
ISSN 0952-1895
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別 GBR
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/118133 )