Regulatory policies on Gramm-Leach-Bliley consolidation of commercial banking, shadow banking, and life insurance
學年 106
學期 1
出版（發表）日期 2017-09-14
作品名稱 Regulatory policies on Gramm-Leach-Bliley consolidation of commercial banking, shadow banking, and life insurance
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Jyh-Horng Lin; Xuelian Li
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 50, p.69-84
摘要 This paper takes a contingent claim approach to the market valuation of equity and default risk in a financial services holding company eligible to consolidate commercial banking, shadow banking and life insurance under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999. We find a case where the GLBA consolidation destroys value captured by scope disequities. Four main results are demonstrated. First, bank capital requirement enhances a likelihood of bankruptcy and destroys value for the consolidated bank. Second, an increase in the regulatory guaranteed interest rate of the life insurance policy increases the default risk and decreases value for the consolidated bank. Third, on the contrary, the regulatory participation rate enhances the survival probability and value for the consolidated bank. Finally, our findings sound a cautionary note to adoption of regulatory mechanisms that may discourage functional consolidation of the GLBA.
關鍵字 Scope equities;Shadow-banking entrusted loan;GLBA
語言 en
ISSN 1042-4431
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度 是
國別 NLD
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/111925 )