Compensation System and Earnings Inequality
學年 101
學期 1
出版(發表)日期 2013-01-01
作品名稱 Compensation System and Earnings Inequality
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Jiang, Lily; Yu, Hsi-Cheng
單位 淡江大學經濟學系
出版者 New York: Springer Science
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of Economic Inequality 12, pp.99-116
摘要 We develop a wage-structure determination model in which a firm with incomplete information offers an optimal sequence of contracts for its heterogeneous employees. The model integrating the principal-agent framework and monitoring mechanism is characterized by endogeneity of the selection of two compensation methods: performance-pay and non-performance-pay schemes. The model is used to examine the switching of pay schemes and its inequality effect. We point out that the growth of performance-pay jobs is accompanied by a downward adjustment of the rewards for performance, which brings forth a countervailing effect on wage inequality. The simulation analysis of a case of uniform-distributed ability reveals that the net effect of the growth of performance-pay jobs on wage inequality depends on the driving force behind the switch.
關鍵字 Performance pay;Principal-agent theory;Earnings inequality
語言 en_US
ISSN 1573-8701 1569-1721
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者 Jiang, Lily
審稿制度
國別 USA
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版,紙本
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/96543 )

機構典藏連結