An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
學年 89
學期 1
發表日期 2000-11-30
作品名稱 An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Hu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang; Ho, Chia-Wen
作品所屬單位 淡江大學產業經濟學系
出版者
會議名稱 亞太地區溫室氣體與環境污染減量策略國際學術研討會 VIII、IX、X=2000 Taipei Conference on Policies for Greenhouse Gases Reduction and Pollution Control in Asian-Pacific VIII、IX、X
會議地點 臺北市, 臺灣
摘要 In contrast with Mookherjee and Png (1995), we start with the basic model without an anticorruption agency to focus on the effect of bribery on environmental enforcement. The distortion by bribery can be eliminated without an anticorruption agency, as long as the wage incentive is fully provided. The major conclusions are as follows:(1) The government can reward part of penalties to the enforcer in order to increase enforcement efforts. (2) The firm gives bribes to decrease the enforcement efforts. However, in the existence of bribery, the enforcer will also increase enforcement efforts in order to gain more bribes. (3) Bribery is a transfer payment which can reduce distortions from enforcer's fixed salary.
關鍵字 賄賂;環境法;經濟分析;Bribery;Environmental Law;Econamic Analysis
語言 en
收錄於
會議性質 國際
校內研討會地點
研討會時間 20001130~20001202
通訊作者
國別 TWN
公開徵稿 Y
出版型式 紙本
出處 亞太地區溫室氣體與環境污染減量策略國際學術研討會VIII、IX、X=2000 Taipei Conference on Policies for Greenhouse Gases Reduction and Pollution Control in Asian-Pacific VIII、IX、X，頁14-33
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