| RJV Competition and Financial Structure | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 88 |
| 學期 | 2 |
| 發表日期 | 2000-06-15 |
| 作品名稱 | RJV Competition and Financial Structure |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Chen, Ho-Chyuan |
| 作品所屬單位 | 淡江大學產業經濟學系 |
| 出版者 | |
| 會議名稱 | 產業經濟學國際學術研討會=2000 Taipei International Conference on Industrial Economics |
| 會議地點 | 臺北市, 臺灣 |
| 摘要 | This paper sets up a three-stage model to analyze firms' optimal behaviors in a RJV. Firms choose the financial structure first, then R&D investment in the RJV, and finally the output level in a Cournot market. Under uncertain cost reduction of R&D, the use of debt commits an aggressive stance---higher R&D effort and output level---but firms may not be better off. Among different structures, the leveraged firm gains the least profit in an asymmetric industry, but gains the most profit in a symmetric leveraged industry. Both using debt and both not using debt are the two subgame perfect equilibria, and both suing debt survives as a focal equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to the prisoner's dilemma outcome in Brander and Lewis. |
| 關鍵字 | 財務結構;研究發展;Cournot競爭;最適行為;研究合資競爭;Financial Structure;R&D;Cournot Competition;Optimal Behavior;Research Joint Venture Competition |
| 語言 | en |
| 收錄於 | |
| 會議性質 | 國際 |
| 校內研討會地點 | |
| 研討會時間 | 20000615~20000617 |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 國別 | TWN |
| 公開徵稿 | Y |
| 出版型式 | 紙本 |
| 出處 | 產業經濟學國際學術研討會論文集=Proceedings of the 2000 Taipei International Conference on Industrial Economics，頁952-974 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/95503 ) |
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