RJV Competition and Financial Structure
學年 88
學期 2
發表日期 2000-06-15
作品名稱 RJV Competition and Financial Structure
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Chen, Ho-Chyuan
作品所屬單位 淡江大學產業經濟學系
出版者
會議名稱 產業經濟學國際學術研討會=2000 Taipei International Conference on Industrial Economics
會議地點 臺北市, 臺灣
摘要 This paper sets up a three-stage model to analyze firms' optimal behaviors in a RJV. Firms choose the financial structure first, then R&D investment in the RJV, and finally the output level in a Cournot market. Under uncertain cost reduction of R&D, the use of debt commits an aggressive stance---higher R&D effort and output level---but firms may not be better off. Among different structures, the leveraged firm gains the least profit in an asymmetric industry, but gains the most profit in a symmetric leveraged industry. Both using debt and both not using debt are the two subgame perfect equilibria, and both suing debt survives as a focal equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to the prisoner's dilemma outcome in Brander and Lewis.
關鍵字 財務結構;研究發展;Cournot競爭;最適行為;研究合資競爭;Financial Structure;R&D;Cournot Competition;Optimal Behavior;Research Joint Venture Competition
語言 en
收錄於
會議性質 國際
校內研討會地點
研討會時間 20000615~20000617
通訊作者
國別 TWN
公開徵稿 Y
出版型式 紙本
出處 產業經濟學國際學術研討會論文集=Proceedings of the 2000 Taipei International Conference on Industrial Economics,頁952-974
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