| Must we know what we mean ? | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 94 |
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2005-12-01 |
| 作品名稱 | Must we know what we mean ? |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | 鄭光明; Cheng, Kuang-ming |
| 單位 | 淡江大學通識與核心課程中心 |
| 出版者 | Kriterion |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Kriterion 19, pp.21-33 |
| 摘要 | In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean |
| 關鍵字 | |
| 語言 | en |
| ISSN | 1019-8288 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 否 |
| 國別 | AUT |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,紙本 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/25990 ) |
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