Branch banking, entry deterrence, and technology decisions
學年 85
學期 1
出版（發表）日期 1997-01-01
作品名稱 Branch banking, entry deterrence, and technology decisions
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Lin, Jyh-horng
單位 淡江大學國際貿易學系
出版者 Amsterdam: Elsevier BV * North-Holland
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 International Review of Economics & Finance 6(4), pp.421-430
摘要 The paper sets up a theoretical model of banking firms to investigate the relationship between oligopolistic competition and technology structure by using the concept of decentralized operating decisions and centralized investment decisions. It concludes that the representative branch and the new entrant will choose the technology which is deviated from its cost-minimization level if neither of them acts as a quasi-competitive deposit demanders in the case of costless reversibility of capacity decision. In the case of capacity reversed not costlessly, the representative branch will choose the cost-minimizing technology level and the entrant's technology decision depends on its rival's conjectural variation.
關鍵字 branch banking; entry deterrence; backward technology; advanced technology
語言
ISSN 1059-0560
期刊性質
收錄於
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別 NLD
公開徵稿
出版型式 紙本
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/19559 )

機構典藏連結