| PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED: THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 99 |
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2010-09-01 |
| 作品名稱 | PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED: THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Wang, Kuang-cheng A.; Lin, Chun-hung A. |
| 單位 | 淡江大學產業經濟學系 |
| 出版者 | Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | The Manchester School 78(5), pp.395-411 |
| 摘要 | Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking order of corporate financing under conditions of information asymmetry. With the possibility that debt financing may lead a firm to bankruptcy, we find first that the external pecking order could be reversed. Second, pooling equilibria also exist in our model in two forms: debt issuance and equity issuance. Our results modify pecking-order theory and explain some empirical findings of Jung et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42 (1996), pp. 159–185). |
| 關鍵字 | |
| 語言 | en |
| ISSN | 1467-9957 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | SSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | |
| 國別 | GBR |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | 電子版 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/61086 ) |
| SDGS | 負責任的消費與生產 |
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