教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 莫少白 MOR SOBOL (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story
學年104
學期1
出版(發表)日期2015/10/01
作品名稱Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Mor Sobol
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Governance 29(3), p.335-350
摘要Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.
關鍵字
語言英文
ISSN0952-1895
期刊性質國外
收錄於SSCI;
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別英國
公開徵稿
出版型式,電子版
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