教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 蔡政言 Tsai Jeng-yan (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation
學年104
學期2
出版(發表)日期2016/02/04
作品名稱Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Chen, Shi; Tsai, Jeng-Yan; Jou, Rosemary
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Applied Economics 48 (37), pp.3508-3525
摘要The call options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to narrow-banking contingent claims of one bank, while the cap options theory is applied to synergy-banking contingent claims of another bank. This article investigates efficiency gains specified as equities of scope associated with the likelihood of the two banks involved in merger under capital regulation. We find that merger incentives are encouraged when the narrowing banking is conducted by the consolidated bank, whereas discouraged when the synergy banking is conducted. Raising bank capital requirement leads to an increased interest margin of the consolidated bank with the narrow banking valuation; however, to a decreased margin of the consolidated bank with the synergy banking valuation. An increase in the capital regulation reduces the merger incentives in the narrow banking valuation whereas increases the merger disincentive in the synergy banking valuation. These findings are consistent with the organizational theory that predicts a comparative advantage of narrow banking proposals in bank mergers.
關鍵字Scope equities;merger;narrow banking;synergy banking;capital regulation
語言英文
ISSN0003-6846;1466-4283
期刊性質國外
收錄於SSCI;
產學合作
通訊作者Tsai, Jeng-Yan
審稿制度
國別英國
公開徵稿
出版型式,電子版,紙本
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