CEO Overconfidence or Private Information? Evidence from U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Companies
學年 105
學期 1
發表日期 2017-01-06
作品名稱 CEO Overconfidence or Private Information? Evidence from U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Companies
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Chia-Ling Ho; Sangyong Han; Gene C. Lai
作品所屬單位
出版者
會議名稱 American Economic Association 2017
會議地點 Chicago, IL., U.S.A.
摘要 This paper uses conventional measures of CEO overconfidence: option holdings-based and net stock purchase-based measures to examine the impact of CEOs who hold firm-specific risk on insurer’s risk-taking and firm performance. We focus on the insurance industry because using reinsurance demand as a proxy for risk-taking provides a precise measurement of CEO’s risk-taking. We find that the two CEO overconfidence measures are negatively associated with insurer’s risk-taking and positively related to firm performance. Our findings suggest that it may not be CEO overconfidence, but rather the private information and the intention to control the company’s risk that drive our results.
關鍵字 CEO Overconfidence;Risk Taking;Firm Performance;Reinsurance Demand
語言 en_US
收錄於
會議性質 國際
校內研討會地點
研討會時間 20170106~20170108
通訊作者
國別 USA
公開徵稿
出版型式
出處 ASSA
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