| Compensation System and Earnings Inequality | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 101 |
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2013-01-01 |
| 作品名稱 | Compensation System and Earnings Inequality |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Jiang, Lily; Yu, Hsi-Cheng |
| 單位 | 淡江大學經濟學系 |
| 出版者 | New York: Springer Science |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Journal of Economic Inequality 12, pp.99-116 |
| 摘要 | We develop a wage-structure determination model in which a firm with incomplete information offers an optimal sequence of contracts for its heterogeneous employees. The model integrating the principal-agent framework and monitoring mechanism is characterized by endogeneity of the selection of two compensation methods: performance-pay and non-performance-pay schemes. The model is used to examine the switching of pay schemes and its inequality effect. We point out that the growth of performance-pay jobs is accompanied by a downward adjustment of the rewards for performance, which brings forth a countervailing effect on wage inequality. The simulation analysis of a case of uniform-distributed ability reveals that the net effect of the growth of performance-pay jobs on wage inequality depends on the driving force behind the switch. |
| 關鍵字 | Performance pay;Principal-agent theory;Earnings inequality |
| 語言 | en_US |
| ISSN | 1573-8701 1569-1721 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | SSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | Jiang, Lily |
| 審稿制度 | 是 |
| 國別 | USA |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,電子版,紙本 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/96543 ) |
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