教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 林志鴻 Jyh-horng Lin (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank
學年103
學期1
出版(發表)日期2014/09/18
作品名稱Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Tsai, Jeng-Yan; Lin, Jyh-Horng; Cheng, Chu-Yun
單位淡江大學國際企業學系
出版者Abingdon: Routledge
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Applied Economics 46(34), pp.4137-4150
摘要A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly increases the strong bank’s default risk. Accordingly, either bailout contributes to banking stability since the indirect positive effect insufficiently offsets the direct negative effect, giving an overall negative response of default risks to an increase in either bailout. Higher competition by shifting to quasi-competition from collusion increases banking stability under either bailout. Our analysis suggests that competition is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability.
關鍵字bank interest margin; default risk; distressed asset purchases; direct equity injections; duopoly; G21; G28
語言英文(美國)
ISSN1466-4283
期刊性質國外
收錄於SSCI;A&HCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別英國
公開徵稿
出版型式電子版
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