教師資料查詢 | 類別: 會議論文 | 教師: 胡均立 HU JIN-LI (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
學年90
學期1
發表日期2001/10/26
作品名稱Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Hu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang
作品所屬單位淡江大學產業經濟學系
出版者
會議名稱執法問題研討會
會議地點臺北市, 臺灣
摘要A three-player model is established in order to examine the effects ofenvironmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on thedecision-makings of the local government, the firm, and the centralgovernment. The model incorporates several important factors such as ahierarchical government, a firm's evasive behaviors (includingemission violation, concealment, and bribery), mixed policyinstruments (tax and penalties), and enforcement (effort and quality).An increase in the emission tax rate might result in more taxes beingreported and less tax evasion under incomplete enforcement. Briberycan cause over-enforcement as well as under-enforcement efforts.Bribery might even promote enforcement efforts especially when theenforcer's 'legal' revenues are independent of his enforcementquality. An increase in the local revenue-sharing and tax and penaltyrates will promote the local government's enforcement effort andquality and thus maybe the bribes, too. However, a stricter emissionstandard enhances the enforcement effort and the violation probabilityand thus may lower the quality of enforcement. The distortion(inefficiency) from bribery can be at least partially offset throughthe revenue-sharing system and/or performance-based incentive scheme.
關鍵字賄賂;貪汙;執行;稅收分配;公共行政;Bribery;Corruption;Enforcement;Revenue-Sharing;Public Administration
語言英文
收錄於
會議性質國內
校內研討會地點
研討會時間20011026~20011026
通訊作者
國別中華民國
公開徵稿Y
出版型式紙本
出處執法問題研討會論文集頁0-30
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