|標題：Insider Trading, Accrual Abuse, and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets - Evidence from Taiwan|
|作品名稱||Insider Trading, Accrual Abuse, and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets - Evidence from Taiwan|
|著者||Tang, Hui-wen; Anlin Chen; Chang, Chong-Chuo|
|出版者||Amsterdam: Elsevier BV * North-Holland|
|著錄名稱、卷期、頁數||Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 24, pp.132-155|
|摘要||This study investigates the endogenous relationship between abnormal insider trading and accrual abuse, and explores whether corporate governance affects this relationship. Our results suggest that insiders take advantage of private information on abnormal accruals to time their trading and manipulate accruals opportunistically to mislead the stock market prior to their planned trading. More important, we ﬁnd that the abuse of inside information for stock trading becomes more serious when a ﬁrm's ultimate controller has a great divergence of control rights (or seat-control rights) from cash ﬂow rights. We also ﬁnd that higher family ownership and control, increased managerial ownership, or a dual leadership structure not only induces more private information trading prior to ﬁnancial reports disclosure, but also
intensiﬁes accrual abuse for future trading. The results for composite governance indices are also consistent with our expectation. Taken together, our evidence suggests that a poor corporate governance system interacts with abnormal insider trading and abnormal accruals, thereby aggravating insider expropriation on outside investors.
|關鍵字||Abnormal accruals;Control rights;Corporate governance;Earnings management;Family control;Insider trading|