教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 林志鴻 Jyh-horng Lin (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
學年93
學期2
出版(發表)日期2005/03/01
作品名稱Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Lin, Jyh-horng ; Lii, Peirchyi ; Chang, Chuen-ping
單位淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
出版者Analytic Publishing Co
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Journal of Information & Optimization Sciences 26(1), pp.143-163
摘要We use a two-stage option-based model to study how Asymmetric information, capital requirements, loan commitment rate and the optimal loan rate relate to one another under an uncertain loan loss source. This model shows that there will be synergies between lending and deposit-taking to the extent that both require the bank to hold large liquid asset balances if its term loans and loan commitments are substitutes. Otherwise, narrow banking management is required by the bank. However, if the bank's term loans and loan commitments are substitutes (complements) and the bank conducts strategic substitutes (strategic complements), there is also real narrow banking. Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the synergy or narrow banking management, which answer the question: if there is real synergy (narrow banking), a forced switch to narrow banking (synergy) could lead to a large inefficiency.
關鍵字Banking;asymmetric information;capital requirement;loan commitment
語言英文
ISSN0252-2667
期刊性質國外
收錄於
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別印度
公開徵稿
出版型式,紙本
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