| 標題：Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market | |
|---|---|
| 學年 | 95 |
| 學期 | 1 |
| 發表日期 | 2006/09/18 |
| 作品名稱 | Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Huang, Rachel J.; Tzeng, Larry Y.; Wang, Kili C. |
| 作品所屬單位 | 淡江大學保險學系 |
| 出版者 | International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics |
| 會議名稱 | The 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE) |
| 會議地點 | Barcelona, Spain |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a new method to directly test the existence of adverse
selection in the automobile insurance market. By tracing the renewal decisions of the insured, we find that, in Taiwan automobile insurance market, the choice of insurance coverage and the previous-year claim records are positive ly correlated, which can be a result of adverse selection but not of moral hazard. We further find that the loss ratio is positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage. This indicates that cross-subsidization may exist in the market. The finding of cross-subsidization further strengthens the evidence to support the existence of adverse selection. |
| 關鍵字 | insurance market, asymmetric information, adverse selection. |
| 語言 | 英文 |
| 收錄於 | |
| 會議性質 | 國際 |
| 校內研討會地點 | |
| 研討會時間 | 20060918~20060920 |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 國別 | 西班牙 |
| 公開徵稿 | Y |
| 出版型式 | 紙本 |
| 出處 | Proceedings of the 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists |
| 相關連結 | |
