Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
學年 95
學期 1
發表日期 2006-09-18
作品名稱 Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Huang, Rachel J.; Tzeng, Larry Y.; Wang, Kili C.
作品所屬單位 淡江大學保險學系
出版者 International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics
會議名稱 The 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE)
會議地點 Barcelona, Spain
摘要 This paper proposes a new method to directly test the existence of adverse 
 selection in the automobile insurance market. By tracing the renewal decisions of the
 insured, we find that, in Taiwan automobile insurance market, the choice of insurance 
 coverage and the previous-year claim records are positive ly correlated, which can be a 
 result of adverse selection but not of moral hazard. We further find that the loss ratio is 
 positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage. This indicates that
 cross-subsidization may exist in the market. The finding of cross-subsidization further 
 strengthens the evidence to support the existence of adverse selection.
關鍵字 insurance market, asymmetric information, adverse selection.
語言 en
收錄於
會議性質 國際
校內研討會地點
研討會時間 20060918~20060920
通訊作者
國別 ESP
公開徵稿 Y
出版型式 紙本
出處 Proceedings of the 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/68350 )

機構典藏連結
SDGS 產業創新與基礎設施,減少不平等,和平正義與有力的制度