教師資料查詢 | 類別: 期刊論文 | 教師: 胡均立 HU JIN-LI (瀏覽個人網頁)

標題:Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate
學年87
學期1
出版(發表)日期1999/01/01
作品名稱Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者Aoki, Reiko; Hu, Jin-li; 胡均立
單位淡江大學產業經濟學系
出版者Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數Journal of economics and management strategy 8(1), pp.133-160
摘要With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.
關鍵字
語言英文
ISSN1058-6407
期刊性質國外
收錄於
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別美國
公開徵稿
出版型式紙本
相關連結
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