期刊論文

學年 98
學期 2
出版(發表)日期 2010-06-01
作品名稱 Playing devious games, budget-emphasis in performance evaluation, and attitudes towards the budgetary process
作品名稱(其他語言)
著者 Huang, Cheng-li; Chen, Mien-ling
單位 淡江大學會計學系
出版者 Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Management Decision 48(6), pp.940-951
摘要 Purpose-The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of playing devious games on the relationship between budget-emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process. Design/methodology/approach-A survey questionnaire was selected. A hierarchical regression was used to analyze the data gathered from 216 Taiwanese managers in listed companies. Findings-The results indicate that playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests moderated the relationships of budget-emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process. The relationships were strong and positive when playing devious games was low, and weak when playing devious games was high. Research limitations/implications-The study depends on manager questionnaire responses and thus variations in emotional responses are a concern. In addition, it remains problematic to question managers regarding their engagement in dysfunctional behaviors because managers may not wish to publicize their gaming strategies. Practical implications-Managers playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests is a significant factor to be considered in attitudes towards the budgetary process. Superiors should communicate with these managers to better understand the purposes of the budget proposals before deciding how to allocate budget resources. Originality/value-The findings should be useful to superiors in understanding how managerial game-playing behaviors impact on the relationship between budget-emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process.
關鍵字 Cost accounting; Budgetary control; Capital budgeting
語言 en
ISSN 0025-1747
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度
國別 GBR
公開徵稿
出版型式 紙本
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