期刊論文
| 學年 | 110 |
|---|---|
| 學期 | 2 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2022-06-16 |
| 作品名稱 | Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Hong-Ren Din; Chia-Hung Sun |
| 單位 | |
| 出版者 | |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Journal of Economics 138, 73–94 |
| 摘要 | This research investigates the endogenous choice of centralized or decentralized bargaining and the type of strategic variables by taking into account a vertically-related market where an upstream monopolist bargains with two downstream firms via a two-part input pricing contract. We show that centralized bargaining is the unique equilibrium mode of bargaining, given Cournot or Bertrand competition in the product market, and that choosing the quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms under decentralized (centralized) bargaining. When both the type of strategic variables and the mode of bargaining are endogenously determined, the unique equilibrium outcome is choosing price contracts and centralized bargaining, which maximize industry profit, but there is market failure. |
| 關鍵字 | Vertically-related markets; Centralized Nash bargaining; Decentralized Nash bargaining; Endogenous strategic variables; Two-part pricing contract |
| 語言 | de |
| ISSN | 1617-7134; 0931-8658 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | SSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 否 |
| 國別 | DEU |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,電子版,紙本 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/128360 ) |