會議論文
| 學年 | 90 |
|---|---|
| 學期 | 1 |
| 發表日期 | 2001-10-26 |
| 作品名稱 | Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Hu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang |
| 作品所屬單位 | 淡江大學產業經濟學系 |
| 出版者 | |
| 會議名稱 | 執法問題研討會 |
| 會議地點 | 臺北市, 臺灣 |
| 摘要 | A three-player model is established in order to examine the effects ofenvironmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on thedecision-makings of the local government, the firm, and the centralgovernment. The model incorporates several important factors such as ahierarchical government, a firm's evasive behaviors (includingemission violation, concealment, and bribery), mixed policyinstruments (tax and penalties), and enforcement (effort and quality).An increase in the emission tax rate might result in more taxes beingreported and less tax evasion under incomplete enforcement. Briberycan cause over-enforcement as well as under-enforcement efforts.Bribery might even promote enforcement efforts especially when theenforcer's 'legal' revenues are independent of his enforcementquality. An increase in the local revenue-sharing and tax and penaltyrates will promote the local government's enforcement effort andquality and thus maybe the bribes, too. However, a stricter emissionstandard enhances the enforcement effort and the violation probabilityand thus may lower the quality of enforcement. The distortion(inefficiency) from bribery can be at least partially offset throughthe revenue-sharing system and/or performance-based incentive scheme. |
| 關鍵字 | 賄賂;貪汙;執行;稅收分配;公共行政;Bribery;Corruption;Enforcement;Revenue-Sharing;Public Administration |
| 語言 | en |
| 收錄於 | |
| 會議性質 | 國內 |
| 校內研討會地點 | |
| 研討會時間 | 20011026~20011026 |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 國別 | TWN |
| 公開徵稿 | Y |
| 出版型式 | 紙本 |
| 出處 | 執法問題研討會論文集，頁0-30 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/95494 ) |