期刊論文
| 學年 | 98 |
|---|---|
| 學期 | 2 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2010-03-01 |
| 作品名稱 | A manufacturer’s optimal quantity discount and return policy through game-theoretic approach again |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Chang, Shu-hui; Pao, Shih-heng |
| 單位 | 淡江大學國際企業學系 |
| 出版者 | Taipei : Graduate Institute of Management Science, Tamkang University |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | International Journal of Information and Management Science 21(1), pp.73-90 |
| 摘要 | This paper utilizes a three-stage game model to discuss the establishment of channel coordination with quantity discount strategy, or together with returns policy. We explore the range of participation condition under circumstances that manufacturer has attained channel coordination by purchase discount or together with returns policy. This paper finds that even retailer further asks manufacturer for return of goods, the implementation of the returns policy would not affect the expected profit of channel members and the whole channel, because the higher the return price is, the higher the wholesale price, i.e. the purchase discount will be lesser. Even buyback price exceeds a limit leads to negative purchase discount; this paper also gets the condition resulting in negative purchase discount. In addition, when purchase discount is set, the stricter the participation condition is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. If maintenance of positive purchase discount is desired, once the stricter the participation condition for retailer given by manufacturer is, the lower the buyback price that manufacturer gives to retailer. From the participation condition, we build the optimal wholesale price that makes channel coordination and Pareto efficiency surely co-exist. |
| 關鍵字 | |
| 語言 | en_US |
| ISSN | 1017-1819 |
| 期刊性質 | 國內 |
| 收錄於 | EI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 否 |
| 國別 | TWN |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,紙本 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/77066 ) |