期刊論文
| 學年 | 87 |
|---|---|
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 1999-01-01 |
| 作品名稱 | Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Aoki, Reiko; Hu, Jin-li; 胡均立 |
| 單位 | 淡江大學產業經濟學系 |
| 出版者 | Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Journal of economics and management strategy 8(1), pp.133-160 |
| 摘要 | With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation. |
| 關鍵字 | |
| 語言 | en |
| ISSN | 1058-6407 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | |
| 國別 | USA |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | 紙本 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/23872 ) |