關鍵字查詢 | 類別:會議論文 | | 關鍵字:and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement

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序號 學年期 教師動態
1 90/1 產經系 胡均立 副教授 會議論文 發佈 Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement , [90-1] :Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement會議論文Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental EnforcementHu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang淡江大學產業經濟學系賄賂;貪汙;執行;稅收分配;公共行政;Bribery;Corruption;Enforcement;Revenue-Sharing;Public Administration執法問題研討會論文集,頁0-30中央研究院經濟研究所A three-player model is established in order to examine the effects ofenvironmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on thedecision-makings of the local government, the firm, and the centralgovernment. The model incorporates several important factors such as ahierarchical government, a firm's evasive behaviors (includingemission violation, concealment, and bribery), mixed policyinstruments (tax and penalties), and enforcement (effort and quality).An increase in the emission tax rate might result in more taxes beingreported and less tax evasion under incomplete enforcement. Briberycan cause over-enforcement as well as under-enforcement efforts.Bribery might even promote en
2 89/1 產經系 胡均立 副教授 會議論文 發佈 An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement , [89-1] :An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement會議論文An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental EnforcementHu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang; Ho, Chia-Wen淡江大學產業經濟學系賄賂;環境法;經濟分析;Bribery;Environmental Law;Econamic Analysis亞太地區溫室氣體與環境污染減量策略國際學術研討會VIII、IX、X=2000 Taipei Conference on Policies for Greenhouse Gases Reduction and Pollution Control in Asian-Pacific VIII、IX、X,頁14-33中央研究院經濟研究所; 台灣水泥公司 The Institute of Economics,Academia Sinica; Taiwan Cement CompanyIn contrast with Mookherjee and Png (1995), we start with the basic model without an anticorruption agency to focus on the effect of bribery on environmental enforcement. The distortion by bribery can be eliminated without an anticorruption agency, as long as the wage incentive is fully provided. The major conclusions are as follows:(1) The government can reward part of penalties to the enforcer in order to increase enforcement efforts. (2) The firm gives bribes to decrease the enforcement efforts.
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