關鍵字查詢 | 類別:會議論文 | | 關鍵字:Subcontracting and international trade policy

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1 89/2 產經系 梁文榮 教授 會議論文 發佈 Subcontracting and International Trade Policy , [89-2] :Subcontracting and International Trade Policy會議論文Subcontracting and International Trade PolicyLiang, Wen-Jung; Chen, Ho-Chyuan; Shi, Mau-Shan淡江大學產業經濟學系國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集,22頁台北大學經濟學系; 教育部; 國科會社會科學研究中心This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted goo
2 89/2 產經系 陳和全 副教授 會議論文 發佈 Subcontracting and International Trade Policy , [89-2] :Subcontracting and International Trade Policy會議論文Subcontracting and International Trade PolicyLiang, Wen-Jung; Chen, Ho-Chyuan; Shi, Mau-Shan淡江大學產業經濟學系國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集,22頁台北大學經濟學系; 教育部; 國科會社會科學研究中心This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted goo
3 89/2 產經系 陳和全 副教授 會議論文 發佈 Subcontracting and international trade policy , [89-2] :Subcontracting and international trade policy會議論文Subcontracting and international trade policy梁文榮; 陳和全; 徐茂炫淡江大學產業經濟學系臺北市:臺北大學經濟系第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集,22頁國立台北大學經濟學系; 教育部; 國科會社會科學研究中心國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy;This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted good is notnecess
4 89/2 產經系 梁文榮 教授 會議論文 發佈 Subcontracting and international trade policy , [89-2] :Subcontracting and international trade policy會議論文Subcontracting and international trade policy梁文榮; 陳和全; 徐茂炫淡江大學產業經濟學系臺北市:臺北大學經濟系第五屆經濟發展學術研討會論文集,22頁國立台北大學經濟學系; 教育部; 國科會社會科學研究中心國際代工;最適貿易政策;Nash談判;行銷成本;國際貿易政策;International Subcontracting;Optimal Trade Policy;Nash Bargaining;Marketing Cost;International Trade Policy;This paper examines the optimal trade policies when internationalsubcontracting occurs between two competing firms. It shows that ifthe comparative advantage effect dominates the cost saving transfereffect, the exporting country will impose a different policy on eachexport. In contrast, if the cost saving transfer effect dominates thecomparative advantage effect, the exporting country will impose a taxpolicy on both exports. However, there never exists an optimal policyto subsidize the export of both subcontracted product and finalproduct. Even though the exporting firm is assumed away its export offinal good, to subsidize the export of the subcontracted good is notnecess
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