關鍵字查詢 | 類別:會議論文 | | 關鍵字:Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market

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1 95/2 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [95-2] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.政治大學風險管理與保險學系第七屆風險管理理論研討會論文集政治大學風險管理與保險學系This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011-10-23T03:56:05Z No. of bitstreams: 0;Made available in D
2 96/1 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [96-1] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.台灣風險與保險學會第一屆年會暨國際學術研討會台灣風險與保險學會; 逢甲大學保險學系This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011-10-23T03:55:52Z No. of bitstreams: 0;Made available in D
3 95/2 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [95-2] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.Asia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association(APRIA) 11th Annual ConferenceAsia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association; National Chengchi UniversityThis paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted
4 96/1 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [96-1] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.American Risk and Insurance Association 2007 annual MeetingAmerican Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA)This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011
5 95/2 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [95-2] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.Asia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association(APRIA) 11th Annual ConferenceAsia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association; National Chengchi UniversityThis paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted
6 95/2 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [95-2] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.政治大學風險管理與保險學系第七屆風險管理理論研討會論文集政治大學風險管理與保險學系This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011-10-23T03:56:05Z No. of bitstreams: 0;Made available in D
7 96/1 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [96-1] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.台灣風險與保險學會第一屆年會暨國際學術研討會台灣風險與保險學會; 逢甲大學保險學系This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011-10-23T03:55:52Z No. of bitstreams: 0;Made available in D
8 96/1 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market , [96-1] :Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market會議論文Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market汪琪玲; 曾郁仁; 王儷玲; 王仁宏淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.American Risk and Insurance Association 2007 annual MeetingAmerican Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA)This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.tku_id: 000133054; 000114768;Submitted by 曉芬 游 (139570@mail.tku.edu.tw) on 2011
[第一頁][上頁]1[次頁][最末頁]目前在第 1 頁 / 共有 08 筆查詢結果