關鍵字查詢 | 類別:會議論文 | | 關鍵字:Hierarchical Government

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序號 學年期 教師動態
1 90/1 產經系 胡均立 副教授 會議論文 發佈 Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement , [90-1] :Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement會議論文Bribery, Hierarchical Government, and Incomplete Environmental EnforcementHu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang淡江大學產業經濟學系賄賂;貪汙;執行;稅收分配;公共行政;Bribery;Corruption;Enforcement;Revenue-Sharing;Public Administration執法問題研討會論文集,頁0-30中央研究院經濟研究所A three-player model is established in order to examine the effects ofenvironmental policy instruments, budget control, and bribery on thedecision-makings of the local government, the firm, and the centralgovernment. The model incorporates several important factors such as ahierarchical government, a firm's evasive behaviors (includingemission violation, concealment, and bribery), mixed policyinstruments (tax and penalties), and enforcement (effort and quality).An increase in the emission tax rate might result in more taxes beingreported and less tax evasion under incomplete enforcement. Briberycan cause over-enforcement as well as under-enforcement efforts.Bribery might even promote en
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