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序號 學年期 教師動態
1 97/1 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance , [97-1] :Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance會議論文Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance黃瑞卿; Huang, Rachel J.; 曾郁仁; Tzeng, Larry Y.; 汪琪玲; Wang, Kili C.淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.台灣風險與保險學會第二屆年會暨國際學術研討會高雄第一科技大學風險管理與保險系; 台灣風險與保險學會This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maint
2 97/1 保險系 曾郁仁 教授 會議論文 發佈 Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance , [97-1] :Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance會議論文Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance黃瑞卿; 汪琪玲; 曾郁仁淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.2008年臺灣經濟計量學會年會臺灣經濟計量學會; 臺灣大學管理學院This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maintenance data from the largest car manufacturer in Taiwan, we demons
3 97/1 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance , [97-1] :Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance會議論文Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance黃瑞卿; 汪琪玲; 曾郁仁淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.2008年臺灣經濟計量學會年會臺灣經濟計量學會; 臺灣大學管理學院This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maintenance data from the largest car manufacturer in Taiwan, we demons
4 97/1 保險系 汪琪玲 教授 會議論文 發佈 Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance , [97-1] :Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance會議論文Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance黃瑞卿; Huang, Rachel J.; 曾郁仁; Tzeng, Larry Y.; 汪琪玲; Wang, Kili C.淡江大學保險學系asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.台灣風險與保險學會第二屆年會暨國際學術研討會高雄第一科技大學風險管理與保險系; 台灣風險與保險學會This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maint
[第一頁][上頁]1[次頁][最末頁]目前在第 1 頁 / 共有 04 筆查詢結果