產經系 胡均立 副教授於
An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement
：An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement會議論文An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental EnforcementHu, Jin-Li; Huang, Chung-Huang; Ho, Chia-Wen淡江大學產業經濟學系賄賂;環境法;經濟分析;Bribery;Environmental Law;Econamic Analysis亞太地區溫室氣體與環境污染減量策略國際學術研討會VIII、IX、X=2000 Taipei Conference on Policies for Greenhouse Gases Reduction and Pollution Control in Asian-Pacific VIII、IX、X，頁14-33中央研究院經濟研究所; 台灣水泥公司 The Institute of Economics,Academia Sinica; Taiwan Cement CompanyIn contrast with Mookherjee and Png (1995), we start with the basic model without an anticorruption agency to focus on the effect of bribery on environmental enforcement. The distortion by bribery can be eliminated without an anticorruption agency, as long as the wage incentive is fully provided. The major conclusions are as follows:(1) The government can reward part of penalties to the enforcer in order to increase enforcement efforts. (2) The firm gives bribes to decrease the enforcement efforts.