關鍵字查詢 | 類別:期刊論文 | | 關鍵字:Vertical Separation and Collusion

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序號 學年期 教師動態
1 108/2 產經系 高國峯 副教授 期刊論文 發佈 Vertical Separation and Collusion , [108-2] :Vertical Separation and Collusion期刊論文Vertical Separation and CollusionKuo-Feng Kao; Chin-Sheng ChenVertical Separation;Trigger Strategy;CollusionTaipei Economic Inquiry 56(2), p.243-266This paper examines an integrated firm’s incentive to undertake vertical separation with forward-looking behavior. In an infinitely repeated game we show that tacit collusion among firms in a final good market is more likely to be sustained under vertical separation than under vertical integration. The integrated firm tends to vertically separate its business if the discount factor is at a medium level and the input price is sufficiently low. Finally, an increase in the input price is socially beneficial if it prevents vertical separation.en_US國內TSSCI;是TWN
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