關鍵字查詢 | 類別:期刊論文 | | 關鍵字:Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation

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序號 學年期 教師動態
1 104/1 外交與國際系 莫少白 助理教授 期刊論文 發佈 Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story , [104-1] :Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story期刊論文Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold StoryMor SobolGovernance 29(3), p.335-350Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy
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