關鍵字查詢 | 類別:期刊論文 | | 關鍵字:Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly

[第一頁][上頁]1[次頁][最末頁]目前在第 1 頁 / 共有 02 筆查詢結果
序號 學年期 教師動態
1 103/1 國企系 林志鴻 教授 期刊論文 發佈 Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank , [103-1] :Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank期刊論文Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bankTsai, Jeng-Yan; Lin, Jyh-Horng; Cheng, Chu-Yun淡江大學國際企業學系bank interest margin; default risk; distressed asset purchases; direct equity injections; duopoly; G21; G28Abingdon: RoutledgeApplied Economics 46(34), pp.4137-4150A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly
2 103/1 國企系 蔡政言 教授 期刊論文 發佈 Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank vs. weak bank , [103-1] :Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank vs. weak bank期刊論文Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank vs. weak bankTsai, Jeng-Yan; Lin, Jyh-Horng; Cheng, Chu-Yun淡江大學國際企業學系bank interest margin;default risk;distressed asset purchases;direct equity injections;duopoly;G21;G28Applied Economics 46(34), pp.4137-4150A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly increases the strong bank’s def
[第一頁][上頁]1[次頁][最末頁]目前在第 1 頁 / 共有 02 筆查詢結果